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Introduction 
"Edwards on the Will" 
" Edwards on the Will" -no single title in American literature has ever had quite the ring of finality, of unquestioned settlement of dispute, as this. For Herman Melville, it was the obvious key 
to unlock the mystery of Bartleby the Scrivener; for Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, it was the supreme creation of the Puritanism he longed to 
shed, so maddeningly perfect in all its parts that it was impervious to 
logical wear and tear; for Harriet Beecher Stowe, it was the touchstone 
of New England Calvinism and New England identity. One hundred 
and ten years after the first appearance of "Edwards on the Will," 
Rowland Hazard, the amateur Quaker-born philosopher, helplessly ac-
knowledged that "by common consent" it was "deemed impregnable." 
In Scotland, Thomas Chalmers lauded it as that "which has helped me 
more than any other uninspired book to find my way through all that 
might otherwise have proved baffling, and tran~cendental, and myste-
rious in the peculiarities of Calvinism." In Isaac Taylor's pungent 
phrase, it taught the world "to be less flippant. " 1 
And yet, for all the laurels heaped upon it, Jonathan Edwards's A 
Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that 
Freedom of Will which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, 
Vertue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame has proven 
in modern times an elusive work. Edwards's literary and historical 
admirers are generally content to let its sleeping dogmas lie, to ac-
knowledge in a breath its genius and then move hurriedly past to other 
Edwardseana of less forbidding aspect. Perhaps this is because it is in 
the nature of literary history to confuse the historical and the aesthetic, 
and to think that an aesthetic appreciation of grandeur is an adequate 
substitute for historical understanding; perhaps it is because Edwards 
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has fared better at the hands of historians of philosophy since they 
usually want, for heuristic purposes, an Edwards of paramount genius 
sufficient to justify the study of American philosophy (and "Edwards 
on the Will" gives them this beyond question); but they also want a 
teleology that will guarantee the triumph of a Benjamin Franklin (who, 
ironically, wrote an early dissertation on freedom of the will himself). 
No one seems to fail to call Freedom of the Will a work of genius; but 
by acknowledging its genius scholars have apparently assumed that 
Freedom of the Will need no longer be taken seriously as history. 
So, for a considerably long period of time, Edwards's massive ex-
position of "that freedom of will" has been treated as a kind of cultural 
oxymoron, without father, without mother, without genealogy, a New 
England Melchizedek greeting a bewildered American Abraham with 
sacrifices which secretly terrify him. It has been stood off by itself, like 
a Puritan doctrine bereft of any uses or applications, as though it were 
feared that the uses of such a work might be more (as someone once 
said of Edwards's personality) than ordinary people could bear. Some-
times, Freedom of the Will has been looked upon as the ultimate jer-
emiad. More often, we have taken Holmes's way out and caricatured 
it as Holmes did in "The Deacon's Masterpiece," as a sort of "won-
derful one-hoss shay," an interesting contraption to be sure, but one 
which conveniently fell apart on its own in some unexplained fashion, 
thus eliminating the need to confront either its claims or its conse-
quences. One literary historian cried out in frustration at a 1984 con-
ference on Edwards, "What does this preoccupation with the will 
mean?" And it was a frustration as much directed at his fellows as at 
Edwards. 
Part of the problem, to be fair, is that our expectations of Edwards 
may actually be too high. Freedom of the Will is a work of philosoph-
ical genius, but Edwards was not a consistent philosopher; he consid-
ered himself first and foremost a Congregational parson and never 
thought of himself as a philosopher. Those who expect his Miscellanies 
(when they are finally published in full) to yield a full intellectual crop 
are in for an unpleasant surprise. Nor is this merely an accident of 
genre, for no work of Edwards reveals his patchiness and "variousness" 
as a thinker more than Freedom of the Will. For instance it is a book 
of undisguised theological intentions, put in terms of a "secular" ar-
gument. And it is also a book which introduces a powerful and sys-
tematic case for Calvinist predestinarianism, but which concludes by 
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asserting that the author, at least on his own terms, really does believe 
in freedom of the will. 
On the other hand, one has to grant at least some of his "various-
ness" to genre, if only because the subject of "free will" encompasses 
so great a stretch of philosophical terrain, and his place as a specifically 
Christian thinker only made his path through that terrain narrower and 
more treacherous. The very ~act that the concept of "will" has found 
a place in Western philosophy owes more to Christian theology than 
a philosophy. The Greeks, for one, never talked about the "will" ?r 
"freedom of the will"; the notion is untranslatable into Platonic or 
Homeric Greek.2 The vital catalyst in the arrival of the idea of an 
independent faculty of will was the intermingling of Christian theology, 
and the psychology it implied, and classical civilization. And no single 
Christian theologian did more to bring the concept of the will, con-
ceived as a separate entity, into common currency than St. Augustine, 
whose Confessions are the first book of Christian spirituality to mark 
out clearly the full force of the limits of human freedom by "a chain 
of habit" within with no reference point other than willing itsel£.3 "I 
knew I had a will [voluntas]," Augustine wrote, "as surely as I knew 
I had life in me." He clearly perceived that, within his conscious self, 
the mind may try to order itself to "make an act of will ... yet it does 
not carry out its own command." Hence, this opposition of mind and 
will is so formidable, and the mind so easily thwarted, that the "will" 
must surely enjoy a status independent of the understanding or the 
appetites, and is sufficiently powerful to check the mind: "the mind is 
not moved until it wills to be moved." Augustine discovered, when he 
first contemplated making a public confession of Christianity, that his 
ideas were entirely at the mercy of an obstinate will: "I was held fast, 
not in fetters clamped upon me by another, but by my own will, which 
had the strength of iron chains."4 Augustine's fascinated exploration 
of the notion of will by no means settled what the nature of that will 
was. 
According to the categories of the Protestant scholastic thought of 
the seventeenth century, the most critical relationship among the fac-
ulties of the mind was considered to be one of intellect and will, both 
of which were viewed, along with perception and judgment, as sub-
departments of the overall phenomenon of mind. Because of the inher-
ent bias of Christian theology toward teleological considerations, the 
Protestant scholastics-Turretin, Burgersdyck, Voetius, de Maastricht, 
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all of whom Jonathan Edwards was to read as a Yale undergraduate-
structured these subdepartments, or faculties, as a hierarchy, and 
graded them from the most important to the least. But there was no 
agreement, even in Calvinist New England, on whether intellect or will 
ought to have first place. "Intellectualists," for instance, placed the 
intellect first, and conceived of thought as a process in which the in-
tellect synthesizes the information provided by perception and judg-
ment and gives the will orders to follow or to flee from the object of 
thought. The intellect, then, was clearly considered to be superior to 
the will, which exists primarily to execute the orders of the intellect. 
While this is certainly not an Augustinian notion, it has strong classical 
overtones nevertheless and it acquired a strong following in Christian 
thought, including the moral philosophy presented in textbooks of Ed-
wards's New England.5 Calvin taught that "the human soul consists of 
two faculties, understanding and will"; the understanding distinguishes 
between good and bad, and the will either follows or flees as the under-
standing dictates. The mind thus judges-and in judging it instructs 
the will how to respond, so that "the understanding is, asrit were, the 
leader and governor of the soul; and that the will is always mindful of 
the bidding of the understanding, and its own desires await the judge-
ment of the understanding." 6 The understanding, Calvin concluded, 
"is our most excellent part; it holds the primacy in the life of man, is 
the seat of reason, presides over the will, and restrains vicious desires. " 7 
Diametrically opposed (at least on paper) to the intellectualist stood 
the "voluntarist," who awarded the will the supremacy over the intel-
lect in choice, and this, too, had an impressive genealogy, stretching 
back through Scotus and the Franciscans to Augustine himself. The 
voluntarist reversed the priority of intellect and will: and viewed the 
process of knowing as beginning with perception, judgment, and in-
tellect, remaining a potential quality until and unless the will chooses 
to cooperate. 8 Voluntarists gave the will this veto power over the in-
tellect itself because they observed that people often see, judge, and 
understand an object to be good and desirable, yet choose evil anyway. 
They further observed that even the acts of perceiving, judging, and 
knowing require decisions to look, to reflect, and to acknowledge. The 
will thus stands at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of faculties; it is es-
sential to each faculty's operation. 
Consequently, the stocking up of the understanding with appropriate 
facts about godliness brings submission, an end to masterlessness, and 
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a decisive act of volition. The most radical scholastic statement of this 
relationship was certainly John Duns Scotus's maxim nihil aliud a 
voluntate est causa totalis volitionis in voluntate9 (the will alone is the 
total cause of choice in the will). But the most piquant scholastic il-
lustration of the incapacity of the intellect to choose is "Buridan's ass." 
An echo of this will turn up in Freedom of the Will in Edwards's 
example of the chess board. Suppose an ass is placed at equal distances 
between two equal bundles of hay. The ass's intellect perceives that 
both are good, but because they are equally good, he cannot tell his 
will which of the two is the greater good to apprehend, and so he dies 
of starvation in the midst of plenty since his will is compelled to wait 
upon recognition by the intellect of which bale is the primary good. 
Obviously, however, asses do not die in this way; any normal ass would 
have been led to the one or the other by an effort of will. It was not 
that voluntarists deprecated knowledge per se, but, in the words of the 
much revered Puritan theologian William Ames, there was no real force 
in it without an application of the will: "will is the principle and the 
first cause of all humane operation in regard to the exercise of the act"; 
thus, "it follows that the first and proper subject of theology is the 
will. 10 
But this left the voluntarists with the need to explain how the will 
could make all thes-e choices prior to the action. The answer supplied 
by one school of voluntarists, ranging from Augustine to Jonathan 
Edwards, was to suggest that the will, although a faculty of the mind, 
was also directly influenced by the other great psychological entity 
within the human soul, the affections. The scholastic psychology, in 
which both Timothy and Jonathan Edwards were reared, pictured man 
as a composite of thinking (which included the mental faculties of 
perceiving, judging, understanding, and willing) and feeling, and they 
regarded the feelings, or affections, as the other great pillar of human 
psychology. The intellectualists had little use for the affections in their 
descriptions of religious psychology; the voluntarists, however, saw that 
the affections (which they sometimes referred to as "the hear~') could 
often play an important role, and they frequently described conversion 
and depravity in terms of the affections, or "the heart." 
The best example of this is Augustine himself. "In my case," Au-
gustine explained, "love is the weight by which I act .... To whatever 
place I go, I am drawn to it by love." The will is not an independent 
actor; it is at the mercy of love. Augustine compared his will to a sack, 
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pulled down to various levels according to the amount of love weighing 
it down. Let the will be filled with the love of God, and the self will 
be drawn to follow the will to God; on the other hand, let the will be 
weighted with lust, and the self will be drawn to it by concupiscence.11 
The will could not be mere freedom, for Augustine discovered time 
and again that his will was not free to countermand what he loved. 
"Through sin freedom indeed perished," Augustine warned, for men 
sin, and love sinning, and so make themselves and their wills so 
weighted with lust that resistance is in vain. "I am better only when 
in sorrow of heart I detest myself and seek your mercy,", Augustine 
prayed to God, "until what is faulty in me is repaired and made whole 
and finally I come to that state of peace which the eye of the proud 
cannot see."12 All the emphasis here is on the quality of the affections, 
the purity of heart, and the proper object of love, and that becomes 
the central factor in choice. 
Even though Calvin is usually classed as an intellectualist, he was 
hesitant to wall off the intellect from the play of the affections, and he 
occasionally granted a degree of independence to the feeling of suavitas 
("sweetness") in religious self-knowledge.13 And as for his Puritan 
heirs, no matter what the Harvard textbooks dictated, "heart-lan-
guage" remained one of the most distinguishing traits of Puritanism. 
John Winthrop knew he could not have been converted at age fourteen, 
when he had his third great round of spiritual excitements, because he 
could not say for sure "how my heart was affected." But when he came 
under the preaching of Ezekiel Culverwell in r 6o6, he found "the min-
istry of the word to come to my heart with power," so that at age 
thirty, God gave to him "enlargement of heart" to "cry, my father, 
with more confidence."14 More than Culverwell, however, Winthrop'~ 
pastor in the New World Boston, John Cotton, set forth clearly for 
Winthrop the Augustinian identification of the will with the "heart." 
"By the heart," Cotton taught, "is here understood, not as sometimes 
it is taken, for the mind and judgment, for they are no such faculties." 
Instead, "by the heart ... is meant the will of a man, which lyes in the 
heart, for as the understanding lyes in the head or braine, so the will 
is seated in the heart."15 And with that, Cotton insisted on the psy-
chological supremacy of this heart-cum-will. "The heart is the princi-
pal! faculty of the soule, it rules all, it sets hand and tongue all within 
a-work." Therefore, Cotton made "keeping the heart" the essence, even 
the synonym, of moral choice: 
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Keepe the heart well, and you keepe all in a goode frame: all the senses behold 
not an object so much as the heart doth; Set before a man any pleasant pros-
pect, and if his mind be on another things, all his senses take no notice of it; 
if the heart be not taken up with a thing, the eye minds it not; present the eare 
with any sweet melodious sound, and it heares and minds it not, because the 
heart was otherwise taken up .... If you have the whole man, and not the 
heart, you have but a dead man, get the heart and you have all. 16 
No matter how one chooses to define the will, the question of great-
est importance will always be whether, given any of these definitions, 
the will is free. Unhappily, the three available answers-"sometimes" 
(soft determinism), "always" (libertarianism), or "never" (hard deter-
minism)-have been applied to each of the basic theories of will, so 
that within each there can be conflicting answers as to whether the will 
is freeY 
"Hard determinism" most often thinks of freedom as self-determi-
nation, and, precisely for that reason, hard determinists as a rule deny 
that the will can be free, simply because they do not believe that 
"selves" have the capacity to determine their own existence, much less 
their own choices. Hard determinism, according to the rationalist phi-
losopher Brand Blanshard, is "the view that all events are caused," or 
"that every event A is so connected with a later event B that, given A, 
B must occur."18 Since it is difficult for most people to argue with the 
apparent obviousness of cause-effect relationships, the "soft determin-
ists," or reconciliationists, generally yield ground and then try to argue 
about what a cause is, rather than deny that things have causes. In 
some circumstances, reconciliationists agree that "cause" describes 
something inevitable. With this notion of cause, which reconciliation-
ists associate with objective compulsion, there is usually a struggle or 
combat in which the loser is necessarily overborne by the cause. There 
remain occasions, nevertheless, in which causality does not induce com-
bat. Most often, reconciliationists point to events in which a subjective 
cause necessitates a certain movement of the will but does so in a 
direction we, in some way, already desire. In this respect, the will is 
caused but at the same time it apprehends what the self really desires 
anyway, and hence, there is no sense of struggle. So long as nothing 
external to the self interferes with such a volition, the reconciliationist 
demands to know why this cannot be considered a free act. 
By "free," the reconciliationist means not noncausal, but simply "the 
ability to act according to one's choices." It is all the difference between 
saying "we are free to do what we will" (which is what the hard 
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determinist opposes) and "we are free to do as we will." Thus, the 
soft determinist will ask only if an act is objectively valid-that the self 
can perform 'tithout physical hindrance-and leave aside the matter 
of subjective validity (whether the self or the will really is the cause of 
what the will wants to do). 19 
The great problem with this, respond the critics of reconciliationism, 
is that it resembles a sort of intellectual shell game in which determin-
ism and free will are alternately hidden or displayed as need arises; or 
a sleight-of-hand trick that reconciles a contradiction chiefly by chang-
ing the meaning of one of the terms. Shell game or not, reconciliation-
ism ironically reflects much of the ordinary patterns of human thought. 
R. E. Hobart has observed: 
In daily life we are all determinists, just as we are all libertarians. We are 
constantly attributing behavior to the character, the temperament, the peculi-
arities of the person and expecting him to behave in certain fashions. The very 
words of our daily conversation ... are full of determinism. And we s~e noth-
ing inconsistent in being aware at the same time [of being] free in choosing. 20 
The mention of libertarianism brings us to the third answer to the 
question of free will. Libertarianism is, essentially, the opposite of de-
terminism, but not the polar opposite, since libertarians will grant that 
some events are caused. In general, the libertarian holds that in every 
circumstance a spontaneous act may or may not occur that, in turn, 
completely changes the course of things, and, says the libertarian, the 
human will is capable of providing such spontaneity.21 It is, in a word, 
uncaused in all, or at least in some, of its motions. 
Straightforward as this sounds, there are ironies in libertarianism no 
less than in reconciliationism. Obviously, there is vast scope for re-
sponsibility here since the soul becomes the only agent of action. But 
if the will is free and uncaused, it may lead us to free action, but it 
may also lead us to meaningless action, or acts done wildly at random, 
and if.the will can be free only by acting out of chance, then we are 
in perhaps a worse position than the hard determinist, who at least is 
supported by laws. 
Perhaps the greatest irony in all of these terms is how little they 
accomplish in the way of persuasion. In some airy world of abstract 
theory it may be possible to arrive at an opinion concerning the will 
simply by examining the alternatives, and then arriving at a serenely 
objective decision. In fact, for most of the history of controversies over 
the will, the very opposite· procedure has taken place: people begin 
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with the opinion that the will is, or is not, free a priori, and they then 
work back from there to which theory of will they propose to hold. 
This occurs chiefly because in Western Christian theology there has 
always been another, more powerful, Will to take into consideration 
beyond that of the individual human. Grant the existence of God, as 
Jonathan Edwards most certainly did, and one at once acknowledges 
a Being more powerful than oneself, and if more powerful then also 
able to restrict or even dictate one's choices, regardless of whether one 
thinks one's will free or not. Add to that the Christian doctrines of the 
sinful depravity of human beings and the necessity of redemption from 
sin by the God-Man, Jesus Christ, and it begins to appear that the 
human will is not only restricted before we can even agree on what it 
is, but that independent human willing may be downright undesirable, 
since the human will, being depraved, can only ever will in defiance 
and rebellion. The most obvious example of the impact of this theo-
logical a priori is John Calvin, who held that 
By his providence, God rules not only the whole fabric of the world and its 
several parts, but also the hearts and even the actions of men .... We mean by 
providence not an idle observation by God in heaven of what goes on in earth, 
but His rule of the world which He made; for he is not the creator of a moment, 
but the perpetual governor .... So he is said to rule the world in His provi-
dence, not only because He watches the order of nature imposed by Himself, 
but because He has and exercises a particular care of each one of his creatures.22 
However, mere declarations of divine sovereignty-and one can get 
them in just as hair-raising a form from St. Thomas Aquinas as from 
John Calvin-do not automatically settle the matter in everyone's mind, 
since people are not generally fond of being told that they can't help 
what they're doing, no matter on whose authority. Calvin's nemesis, 
the Dutch theologian Jacobus Arminius, rejected Calvin's notions of 
divine sovereignty on the humanitarian grounds that 
it is scarcely possible for any other result to ensue, than that the individual 
who cannot even with great difficulty work a persuasion within himself of his 
being elected should soon consider himself included in the number of the 
reprobate. From such an apprehension as this must arise a certain despair of 
performing righteousness and obtaining salvation.23 
Arminius was perfectly happy to have God rule by "influence and con-
currence" in man's salvation, but only so long as this activity amounts 
to no more than an "influence" on the recipients of it. Certainly Calvin 
and Luther and Augustine felt the sting of these criticisms, and in their 
10 Introduction 
writings we see some of the finest, as well as most tortUred, demon-
strations of reconciliationism available, as each rushes to retort that he 
is really not denying free will at all. Augustine, in his struggle with the 
Pelagians, insisted that we always possessed liberum arbitrium, but not 
libertas-we have, in other words, freedom to perform the act of choice 
in all cases not involving outright physical compulsion, but we do not, 
as sinners, have the liberty to choose the objects of choice. 24 Luther 
strained in his polemic reply to Erasmus, De Servo Arbitrio, to make 
it plain that he was preaching "a necessity, not of compulsion, but of 
what they call immutability." 25 Even Calvin claimed, "<;:ompulsion I 
always exclude," for though "we can do nothing of our own accord 
but sin ... this does not therefore mean ... a forced restraint but a 
voluntary obedience, to which an inborn bondage inclines us." 26 Even 
Timothy Edwards's near contemporary, John Norton of Boston, in-
sisted that "Necessity of infallibility doth not prejudice liberty." 27 
But theological reconciliationism, like reconciliationism in general, 
always has an air of unreality to it, of talk that somehow masks the 
obvious. Calvin recognized this when he pondered the sort of free will 
left by the reconciliationist versions of "necessity": 
Man will then be spoken of as having this sort of free decision, not because 
he has free choice equally of good and evil, but because he acts wickedly by 
will, not by compulsion. Well put, indeed, but what purpose is served by 
labelling with a proud name such a slight thing? A noble freedom, indeed-
for man not to be forced to serve sin, yet to be such a willing slave that his 
will is bound by the fetters of sin.28 
If we are all that eager to have free will, why not jettison predestination 
and save ourselves the grief of logic-chopping? Because, no matter how 
badly we desire to avoid holding a "repugnant" opinion, predestination 
has been a vital emotional part of Christianity, perhaps even more 
important for its aesthetic than for its doctrinal use. Just how much 
emotion lay behind the abstractions of "necessity" appears in manifold 
places, but never more dramatically than in Luther, who denied not 
only that he had free will but that he even wanted it: 
I frankly confess that, for myself, even if it could be, I should not want free-
will to be given to me, nor anything to be left in my own hands to enable me 
to endeavour after salvation; not merely because in the face of so many dangers, 
and adversities, and assaults of devils I could not stand my ground, and hold 
fast my "free-will" ... but because, even were there no dangers, adversities or 
devils, I should still be forced to labour with no guarantee of success, and to 
beat my fists at the air. If I lived and worked to all eternity, my conscience 
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would never reach comfortable certainty as to how much it must _do to satisfy 
God. Whatever work I had done, there would still be a nagging doubt as to 
whether it pleased God, or whether he required something more. The experi-
ence of all who seek righteousness by works proves that; and I learned it well 
enough myself over a period of many years.29 
In this context, Arminian (or Pelagian or Erasmian) "free-will" became 
a metaphor for religious indifference. And so, until the seventeenth 
century, the energies of Protestantism were linked, in various ways, to 
determinism and predestination, and doctrines of free will were con-
sidered at best to be evidence of a half-hearted Erasmianism, and, at 
worst, downright atheism. 
The philosophical revolution of the seventeenth century we some-
times call the "New Philosophy" successfully stood that arrangement 
on its head, and sent Protestant divines fleeing to free will for protection 
from a new kind of determinism-an atheistic one. The fundamental 
cause for this dramatic shift lies in the seventeenth century's daring 
overthrow of the Aristotelian mechanics, with its conception of matter 
as something moving according to active, "occult" powers, by the new 
mechanics of Kepler and Galileo, with their notion of an impersonal 
and indifferent matter being moved by other matter. While the purely 
physical aspects of this revolution had little to do with theology, it 
quickly became apparent, and not only to Galileo's ecclesiastical in-
quisitors, that the denial of activity to matter and the exclusion of 
spiritual causality lay bare a route to denying the activity of God in 
the universe, and perhaps to atheism as well. An agitated Richard 
Baxter compared his modern "Epicureans" to "idle boys who tear out 
all the hard leaves of their books and say they have learned all when 
they have learned the rest," for "they cut off and deny the noblest parts 
of nature and then sweep together the dust of agitated atoms and tell 
us that they have resolved all the phenomena in nature." 30 On those 
terms, as Baxter well knew, there can be no predestination (in the sense 
of a divine spiritual cause) but likewise there can be no self-determi-
nation either, and humanity would, in that case, turn out to be the 
plaything of a faceless determinism that makes nonsense of responsi-
bility and moral choice. 
The face of this new determinism was limned out with what 
amounted to intellectual glee by the most notorious of Baxter's "Epi-
cureans," Thomas Hobbes, and though he was almost the only one to 
put it as bluntly as he did in his Leviathan (1651), he still succeeded 
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in scaring the entire English-speaking theological community out of its 
wits. Hobbes preached a materialism so thoroughgoing as to make 
seventeenth-century readers wince, but what drove them wild was 
Hobbes's strategy of presenting a thoroughly materialistic concept of 
causality in theological terms. After all, to assert that all events happen 
as a result of God's laws does not seem to be saying anything all that 
much different from the claim that everything in the universe happens 
as a result of mechanical laws. This allowed the rankest materialist to 
denounce free will with all the zeal of the most spiritual Calvinist. 
"The question," Hobbes began, "is not whether a man be a free agent," 
since liberty "is the absence of all impediments to action that are not 
contained in the nature and intrinsical quallty of the agent." There is 
no such thing as a "faculty" of willing, bound or unbound; "will" is 
merely the product of a chain of purely physical occurrences: 
I conceive that in all deliberations, that is to say, in alternate succession of 
contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the WILL, and is immediately 
next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it becomes 
impossible. All other appetites to do, and to quit, that come upon a man during 
his deliberations, are called intentions, and inclinations, but not wills, there 
being but one will, which also in this case may be called the last wil1.31 
Hobbes, in short, simply reduced the elaborate structure of scholastic 
psychology to a rubble of words, and eliminated any fundamental dis-
tinction between active or passive, dominant or subordinate, faculties 
within the mind. He conceived of volition in terms of a "single-stage" 
occurrence in which a single volition is merely an extension of an 
appetite, so that the will is whittled down to nothing more than a name 
by which we identify the last in a series of· appetites. Add to that 
Hobbes's consideration that the appetites themselve& are merely the 
mechanical by-product of sensation, and then one has but to supply an 
external cause, and the whole chain of appetites will necessarily and 
inexorably produce a volition. 
I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the actions of 
some other immediate agent without itself. And that therefore, when first a 
man hath an appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he 
had no appetite or will, the cause of his will, is not the will itself, but something 
else not in his disposing. To that whereas it is out of controversy, that of 
voluntary actions the will is the necessary cause ... it followeth that voluntary 
actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated. 32 
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Of course, then, men were free-just as the Calvinists had said, they 
were free to do what it was decreed they should do, only now material 
substance was doing the decreeing. This left the Calvinist with the 
unpleasant alternative of having to assert indeterminism and libertari-
anism to order to prove that the mechanical clashing of gears was not 
all there was to the world, or else be tarred with the brush of Hobbes's 
mechanism. "There is a plain agreement," Daniel Whitby declared, 
"betwixt the doctrine of Mr. Hobbes, and of these men [Calvinists], 
concerning this matter, as to the great concernments of religion," and 
Calvinists, even great and famous ones like Isaac Watts, took appro-
priate note and abandoned the predestinarian ship.J3 
The only way left to prove the existence of spiritual substance seemed 
to be to create some room for the free will of intelligent, spiritual 
creatures, and this is precisely what English-speaking divines; Anglican 
and Nonconformist alike, rushed, if in a confused and unholy jumble, 
to do. They did so, as Samuel Clarke and Richard Bentley did, by 
pushing the question of active and passive powers back to the front 
and by insisting that volition really comprises a "two-stage" process 
in which passive desires are carefully distinguished from an active 
~ill-"a different Thing from the Act of Volition"-which is exempt 
from causal necessity and which is empowered to deal rationally and 
morally with whatever the desires may be.34 In his Boyle Lectures of 
I704 and r705, Clarke insisted that the will was an active, independent 
agent, and not subject to simple determination: 
intelligent beings are agents; not passive in being moved by motives as a balance 
is by weights, but they have active powers and do move themselves, sometimes 
upon weak ones and sometimes where things are absolutely indifferent. 35 
Or they did so, as Thomas Reid and the Scottish "common sense" 
philosophers did, by appealing to the direct intuition of freedom which 
all men find when they have "looked into their own breasts," for the 
common sense of mankind intuitively senses that acts of will occur 
freely.36 Together, their endeavor to undercut the threat of materialistic 
atheism by resorting to hastily fashioned brands of theistic libertari-
anism raised up and made respectable the old banner of "Arminianism" 
and threw Calvinism into a disarray from which it has never entirely 
emerged. 
A large part of this book is given over to examining how New En-
gland Calvinism, and particularly Jonathan Edwards, ~esponded to this 
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crisis. The "covenant" theology upon which so much of New England's 
clergy was built was itself a will-oriented theory, as was the word 
covenant itself. Unlike the medieval Church, which inherited from 
Thomas Aquinas a view of the relationship of God and human as static 
and naturalistic, the Reformation conceived of that relationship as dy-
namic-an unnatural, arbitrary relationship between two utterly unlike 
parties, which can be bridged only by an act of will. The ".covenant" 
theology of the Puritans was simply another way of recognizing that 
to cross the gap separating the human being and God requires a vol-
untary, gracious transaction-an effort of will. Similarly, the "cove-
nanted" churches of the New England Puritans were also a recogni-
tion that sin divides people from people, as well as people from God. 
They testified that the comprehensive, parish-type organization of the 
Church of England was as ineffective in bridging the human gap as 
Thomism had been in bridging the divine gap. Accordingly,, the "cov-
enanted" church embodied the same principle as the covenant theology, 
that true union could not be had on natural terms but only by a con-
scious consent-again, an effort of will. Thus, the Puritan Calvinism 
of New England found itself absorbed in the need to understand and 
control the activity and freedom of the will. And since the greater part 
of American intellectual life before the Civil War was in one way or 
another linked to Trinitarian Calvinism, it is no surprise that any ap-
proach to the problem of freedom of the will ends up heavily weighted 
with the names of New England Calvinists. 
But Edwards's name towers above them all, and not just because his 
Freedom of the Will deals with this dilemma in a fashion sophisticated 
beyond the grasp of any other Calvinists (or perhaps any other Amer-
icans), and turned all subsequent discussion of freedom of the will for 
a century thereafter into a referendum on his ideas. On the broadest ~ 
level, Edwards aimed to address an international audience, and thus ~ 
deal with the perplexing reversal of roles in the eighteenth-century free- '! 
will debate. But Edwards also intended to speak to a problem in the 
New England mind, and Freedom of the Will is as much directed to 
weak-kneed Calvinists as it is to hard-core Arminians. Freedom of the 
Will was Edwards's means of reawakening New England to the de-
mands of the will and to the dreadful anger of a God who kept wicked 
individuals out of hell only by a pure, arbitrary act of mercy. In this 
respect, Freedom of the Will shoots beyond the customary philosoph-
ical targets in the free-will debate to strike at the comfortable natural-
•· 
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ism into which a century of prosperity had wooed the erstwhile soldiers 
of the Covenant. 
Indeed, Edwards did not really address the problem of free will as a 
problem, after all. Instead, he used it as a way to speak to the deepest 
urges of Puritanism and of New England's ~ollective memory of its 
own uniqueness, for Edwards's elevation of the critical significance of 
utter individual choosing in religion and ethics boded ill for the organic 
church-and-community relationships that American Calvinists, in New 
England and elsewhere, had either inherited or copied from Europe. 
After Edwards's death, his New Divinity disciples, bound together by 
the cords of Freedom of the Will's logic in the most remarkable spec-
ulative coterie even seen in America, launched a savage assault on the 
comfortable quid pro quo of church and parish under which most 
Calvinists had become content to live. The questions Edwards taught 
them to ask, and the answers he taught them in Freedom of the Will 
to give, pricked the very heart of the New England self-conception. 
Calvinists who might otherwise have welcomed the prospect of such a 
mind as Edwards's wrestling with the Arminians now found that Ed-
wards's way of talking about free will cut them down as freely as it 
did the Arminians. For that reason, the real struggle created by Free-
dom of the Will in American thought has next to nothing to do with 
the Arminians (and so people like the Methodists occupy a space in 
this work appropriate to that role); instead, it becomes a scramble in 
which American Calvinists try to find some other way of talking about 
Calvinism, before the apostles of Freedom of the Will destroy them. In 
the end, they found an answer in Nathaniel William Taylor; but 
whether his answer satisfied the question, or merely the questioners, 
remains another subject. 
Because he was dealing with the most fundamental idea of his com-
munity, Jonathan Edwards used Freedom of the Will to give reason to 
his own ideal of human community. Like so many other New England 
theologians, he could not escape a measure of ambivalence: the same 
wills that made an awakened Northampton, Massachusetts, sing in 
four-part harmony could turn and destroy him in a strident chorus of 
denunciation, and he had in the end to admit that he could speak of a 
necessary result to human choice only in a very qualified sense. His 
was not a complete triumph. But his was not a complete loss, either. 
Freedom of the Will, the deacon's masterpiece of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, 
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the wonderful one:hoss shay, 
That was built in such a logical way 
It ran a hundred years to a day .... 
did not fall apart on the anniversary of Lisbon earthquake day, after 
all. It remains a necessary document of American uniqueness. 
Since so much of this discussion occurs in the context of Christian 
theology, it would be :well to clarify here that, in the minds of the 
participants in this particular discourse, it was human will after the 
Fall of Adam, as a sinner, that was the object of intere.st. There is, of 
course, a substantial literature on the nature and function of,Adam's 
will prior to the Fall, but; except where I have specifically indicated it, 
the subject under examination by Edwards and his followers and his 
critics is the human will as it now is. 
The opening chapters of this book concentrate on Edwards's per-
sonal involvement with the question of free will and give a particular 
analysis of Freedom of the Will. This is followed by an overview of 
how Edwards's disciples, the New Divinity Men, took Freedom of the 
Will as a sort of cantus firmus for their Calvinism, and used and 
applied it against the peculiarities of New England's church-in-society. 
Attention then turns to the Old Calvinists of New England to discuss 
their rage and panic when confronted with the challenges of Edward-
sean theory and New Divinity practice; and then to the Presbyterians 
of the Middle Atlantic region, who seemed natural opponents but 
among whom Edwards's views found some ardent disciples. The last 
chapters introduce the figure of Nathaniel William Taylor, who laid the 
troublesome ghost of Freedom of the Will to rest, at least as far as the 
peace of mind of American theology was concerned. That by no means 
meant the end of the free-will debate in Ametica; but it did signal the 
end of its importance as a theological question. 
